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is	 purely	 declaratory;	 in	 practice	 the	 Kremlin	 is	 striving	 to	
maintain	the	political	status quo	on	the	peninsula.	At	the	same	
time,	 Russia	wants	 to	maximise	 its	 influence	 by	 developing	
economic	 relations	 and	 maintaining	 political	 contacts	 with	
both	Koreas.
•	 Moscow	 does	 not	 view	 the	 denuclearisation	 of	 North	 Korea	
as	 one	 of	 its	 priorities.	 Its	 approach	 to	 Pyongyang’s	 nuclear	
programme	 is	 instrumental;	 in	Moscow’s	eyes,	although	 the	
program	poses	certain	risks	for	Russia,	it	also	opens	a	number	





•	 The	course	of	 the	 crisis	 so	 far	has	demonstrated	 that	Russia	
does	not	have	sufficient	tools	to	influence	the	course	of	events.	
As	a	consequence,	 it	has	had	to	accept	a	role	as	China’s	 ‘jun-









































I. KorEa: ruSSIa’S ambITIonS and InTEnTIonS 
Russia’s	reactions	to	the	crisis1	were	mainly	determined	by	Mos-


























































peated	 attempts	 to	 arrange	 either	 a	meeting	 between	Vladimir	
Putin	with	the	leader	of	North	Korea,	or	a	tri-partite	‘mini	sum-
mit’	between	the	Russian	president	and	the	leaders	of	the	two	Ko-
reas,	 appear	 to	 serve	 this	purpose.	Moscow	has	also	 repeatedly	
called	on	the	international	community	to	establish	a	multilateral	

























principal	 goals.	The	 Kremlin	 intends	 to	 capitalise	 on	 the	 prob-
lem	of	Pyongyang’s	nuclear	programme,	treating	it	as	a	circum-










weapons,	 Russia’s	 proposals	 –	 as	 formulated	 alongside	 its	 de-
clared	support	for	full	denuclearisation	–	de facto point	towards	
the	 ‘legalisation’	 of	 North	 Korea’s	 nuclear	 status.	 This	 would	
be	the	result	 if	Washington	were	to	accept	Russia’s	proposal	to	









Кризис и новая повестка дня для Корейского полуострова и региональных 
держав,	IMEMO	RAN,	Moscow	2018,	p.	56.	See	also	the	statement	by	Ser-
gey	Ryabkov,	Russia’s	deputy	foreign	minister,	in	reaction	to	North	Korea’s	
nuclear	tests	in	September	2017,	Говорить о возникновении ядерной угрозы 
России со стороны КНДР нельзя,	TASS,	4	September	2017.	
























the	 chairmanship	 of	 a	working	 group	 appointed	 to	 devise	 the	








On	 the	one	hand,	 the	Kremlin	condemns	 the	North	Korean	nu-
clear	programme	and	the	DPRK’s	withdrawal	from	the	Treaty	on	
the	Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	Weapons,	and	has	declared	that	










5	 A	 sceptical	 assessment	of	North	Korea’s	 achievements	 is	 also	 evident	 in	
recent	analyses	by	Russian	experts,	see	С.	Лузянин,	Чжао	Хуашэн	(ed.),	

















a	radical	 shift	 in	 the	military	and	strategic	balance	of	power	 in	
North-East	Asia”6.	Russia	has	emphasised	that	the	DPRK’s	drive	to	
obtain	nuclear	weapons	was	a	natural	consequence	of	the	threat	






out	 using	 any	military	 or	 economic	 pressure	 (sanctions).	 It	 has	
also	 supported	North	Korea’s	demands	 for	 economic	 compensa-
tion	from	Western	states	for	suspending	or	giving	up	its	nuclear	
programme.	
The	 most	 telling	 element	 of	 Moscow’s	 Korean	 policy	 was	 the	
negative	 position	 that	 Russian	 diplomacy	 had	maintained	 until	
autumn	 2017	 towards	 the	 US’s	 initiatives	 (which	 were	 usually	
supported	by	other	Western	powers,	 Japan	and	South	Korea)	on	
the	UN	 Security	 Council	 to	 impose	 economic	 sanctions	 against	



























































‘junior	 partner’.	The	 attempts	 to	 rebuild	Russia’s	 relations	with	





The	 ostentatious	 rapprochement	 with	 North	 Korea	 (after	 the	 first	
meeting,	Putin	met	North	Korean	leader	Kim	Jong-il	twice	more,	 in	







































currencies.	 The	 only	 major	 Russian	 economic	 investment	 in	









of	 around	 US$11	 billion.	 Russia	 remitted	 90%	 of	 this	 debt	 and	





























2014,	after	 three	years’	pause,	meetings	of	 the	 Intergovernmen-
tal	 Commission	 on	 Trade,	 Economic,	 Scientific	 and	 Technical	
Cooperation	were	resumed,	 the	Russian-North	Korean	Business	
Council	was	 established,	 and	Russian	 and	North	Korean	 banks	
opened	 mutual	 correspondent	 accounts	 to	 enable	 transactions	
in	roubles14.	All	these	measures	failed	to	bring	any	major	results.	





















Economic	Relations’	in	Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies	27	(2016),	p.	213,	216;	
http://tass.ru/ekonomika/5054861




техническое сотрудничество Российской Федерации и Корейской Народно-

















yang,	 these	 agreements	 cover	 the	 post-warranty	 servicing	 of	
Soviet-	and	Russian-made	military	equipment17.	
In	November	 2015,	 Russia	 signed	 an	 agreement	with	 the	DPRK	
on	preventing	dangerous	military	activities18,	pursuant	to	which	
a	 joint	 military	 committee	 was	 established.	 The	 committee	 is	
scheduled	to	hold	meetings	at	least	once	a	year;	its	first	meeting	














were	 worth	 US$2.5	 billion.	 South	 Korea	 has	 become	 Russia’s	
sixth	biggest	trade	partner	in	terms	of	trade	volume	(outside	the	
CIS	area).	However,	taking	into	account	South	Korea’s	economic
17	 Александр Мацегора: любое сотрудничество с КНДР сейчас упи ра ется в 
санкции,	RIA	Novosti,	18	July	2018,	https://ria.ru/20180718/1524836372.html
18	 Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерации и Прави тель-
ством Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики о предотвращении 
опасной военной деятельности,	http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/inter-
national_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-20/43776
19	 See	 the	 press	 release	 published	 by	 the	 Embassy	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federa-











































450 000 [US$ thousands] 









































22	 Data	 for	 2017.	The	 author’s	 own	 calculation,	 based	 on	 data	 available	 on	
the	 official	websites	 of	 South	Korea’s	 customs	 service,	 http://www.cus-
toms.go.kr/kcshome/trade/TradeCountryList.do?layoutMenuNo=21031,	
http://english.motie.go.kr/en/if/tb/trade/tradeList.do
23	 Calculated	 based	 on	 data	 after	 Оперативные данные по статистке 
внешней торговли Российской Федерации за 2017 г.,	p.	1,	Tab.	3,	p.	6,	Tab.	7,	
p.	10;	Оперативные данные по статистике внешней торговли Российской 




sector	was	US$27–57	billion,	US$39	billion	on	average.	Korea in Global Value 































25	 Roskomflot’s	 official	 website:	 http://sovcomflot.ru/en/f leet/f leetlist/
item388.html
26	 Котел – регазификатор на строящемся в Южной Корее для Кали нинградской 
области плавучем СПГ-терминале (FSRU) Маршал Васи левский при 





















































laid	 the	 essential	 basis	 for	 the	Korean	military	 rocket	 building	
programme.	Alongside	 this,	 Russian	 arms-manufacturing	 com-
panies	 (Almaz-Antey	 and	 Fakel)	 cooperated	 with	 South	 Korea	




29	 ‘Russia	to	Settle	Soviet	Debt	in	2017’,	The Moscow Times,	17	February	2017,	
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-to-settle-its-soviet-debts-be-
end-of-2017-57193
30	 Ён	Сонг	Хым,	Россия и Республика Корея: взгляд из Сеула,	March	2012,	
https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/628;	 В.	 Самсонова,	 Сотру дни-
чество России и Южной Кореи в области науки, техники и образования,	
30	 September	 2013,	 http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/
analytics/sotrudnichestvo-rossii-i-yuzhnoy-korei-v-oblasti-nauki-tekhn/;	
М.	 Казанин,	 Корейские оружейники загорелись от нашего «Факела»,	
18	April	2017,	https://vpk-news.ru/articles/36289;	S.	Roblin,	South Korea is 

































































IV. THE KorEan crISIS and ITS conSEquEncES 
for ruSSIan-cHInESE rElaTIonS 
The	aggravation	of	 tension	around	the	DPRK	and	its	nuclear	&	
missile	 programme	 in	 2017	 came	 as	 a	major	 challenge	 for	 the	
Kremlin,	 which	 now	 had	 to	 take	 into	 account	 that	 President	












North	 Korean	 regime.	 A	 successful	 military	 campaign	 would	
also	significantly	strengthen	the	position	of	 the	United	States,	







































ed	 step.	This	 step	 involved	 formulating	 the	 initiative	 (together	
with	China)	of	the	so-called	double	freeze,	proposed	by	the	two	
countries’	foreign	ministers	during	the	Chinese	President	Xi	Jin-
ping’s	 visit	 to	Moscow	on	 4	 July	 2018.	This	 boiled	 down	 to	 the	
DPRK	 freezing	 its	 nuclear	 and	missile	 tests	 and	 a	 concurrent	
suspension	 of	 joint	 American-Korean	 military	 exercises	 “on	
a	large	scale”34.







tions	 (the	 smuggling	 of	 oil,	 illegal	 imports	 of	 coal	 and	marine	
products)	which	Western	 intelligence	services	have	uncovered	
were	carried	out	by	Moscow	with	the	tacit	agreement	of	China.	




















ing	harsh	 sanctions.	Another	 intention	was	 to	 demonstrate	 to	
the	US	 that	China	 is	 ready	 to	 change	 its	 former	policy	of	 ‘pro-
tecting’	the	DPRK	to	reduce	the	risk	of	Trump	deciding	to	launch	
military	action.	On	the	other	hand,	China	does	not	want	to	trig-






clearly	 been	 less	 prominent	 than	 that	 of	 Beijing.	The	most	 evi-
dent	manifestation	of	Beijing’s	dominance	has	been	the	fact	that	
the	North	Korean	 leader	Kim	Jong-un	has	 travelled	 to	China	up	







































tion	responsible	for	international	affairs,	Ясности с возможным визитом 















V. THE SummIT In SIngaPorE from 





Official	 statements	 emphasised	 that	 the	 summit	has	 set	 a	 prec-




























































of	 capitalising	 on	 regional	 tensions	 and	 North	 Korea’s	 nuclear	
ambitions	to	engage	in	geopolitical	rivalry	with	the	United	States	






38	 Россия допустила возможность поднятия вопроса о санкциях против КНДР 
в ООН,	RIA	Novosti,	18	July	2018;	‘РФ	выступает	за	постепенное	смягчение	
санкций	против	КНДР’,	RIA	Novosti,	26	July	2018.




















sumptions	 of	 its	 foreign	 policy;	 it	 should	 therefore	 be	 expected	
that	its	further	actions	will	focus	on	posing	as	an	‘essential’	par-
ticipant	 in	 the	 geopolitical	 game	 that	 is	 ongoing	 around	Korea,	
and	at	the	same	time	on	the	continued	and	unavoidable	‘coordina-
tion’	of	Russia’s	policy	with	that	of	Beijing.	
Witold RodkieWicz
